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Park West Associates and Beaver Creek Associates (collectively "PWA"), by and 
through counsel, submit this Reply Brief in support of their appeal from the trial court's 
denial of their Motion to Compel Arbitration. 
INTRODUCTION 
In its brief, Central Florida Investments, Inc. ("CFI") offers three arguments in 
support of the trial court's ruling: (i) the Arbitration Clause in Paragraph 12 of the Contract 
Addendum is not an enforceable arbitration provision; (ii) even if the Arbitration Clause is 
enforceable, it does not cover the instant dispute; and (iii) PWA waived its right to enforce 
the Arbitration Clause. See Brief of Appellee at 11-28. As shown below, each of these 
arguments fails. The Arbitration Clause is valid and should be enforced; the parties' dispute 
is squarely within the scope of the Arbitration Clause; and PWA has not waived its right to 
arbitration. This Court, therefore, should reverse the trial court's ruling and remand with 
instructions that an order be entered compelling arbitration of the parties' dispute. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE IS VALID AND SHOULD BE ENFORCED. 
CFI cites, at length, case law indicating that arbitration will not be compelled unless 
the parties agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration. See Brief of Appellee at 11 (citing 
Cade v. Zions First NatfI Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). PWA agrees 
with this legal principle; indeed, it is the primary reason why the trial court erred in denying 
PWA's Motion to Compel Arbitration. The parties expressly agreed that "[a]ny 
disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrateo 
Addendum; R. at .iO, unpha.iis .iddedi II * 11ini«11. In « uiiiprl 'nhilralinn flic trial court 
failed In )i\\ i eld rl In (In p.irluV agreement to submit to arbitration any dispute over the 
terms of the Contract. 
Arbitration provisions must be construed in accordance with tne}.;: i 
'
i t L c A*. • A . p. i yyjj. 
1
 LO arbitrate ib clear irom the first sentence uf the Arhm • * -
Clause. It is also e\ ident from the parties' placement of the Arbitration Clause n -he 
Contiact Addendum the term^ : iJ> expresslv superset . .. 
resolution n. :i:°Mon, tSce 
Coi >s* : ;. i he Contract Addendum states: 
oiler supercedes the Real Estate Purchase Contract dated 
! 1: 1^98. . . To the extent the terms of this Addendum 
ifv or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including 
i*.. .nior addenda and counteroffers, these terms shall control. 
(( mil it! U at W> ' v 7 i 
CFl apparentl} belie\es thai if an arbitration clause docs not define the arbitration 
process iKelf -<- do vnr-v*" ,n/uonarv dLiinmwi, ; . i . . , , 
unenforceable- , k - s .d-ucning. 
W'hn j i onirnn «ises the term "arbitrate" or "arbitration" in describi:.0 pute resolution 
process selected by the parties, it is a term of art. earn ing with "t the very meaning set forth 
in the dictionary definitions quoted» . ^ . , e ' c , > : .,. f ding Ihal'. mi 
"arbitrate" and "arbitration" are words at lc't:al siymlicuncel HICK; i1^ II<> iiu\l h.r fL 
contract to elahohiU liiilln i iiii llliii inrnmii}.1 nil .mttilniliun. 
CFI states that the Arbitration Clause "does not require any kind of determination by 
neutral third parties," BriefofAppell.ee ai TV This assertion is flatly contradicted by the 
V-1-itrrinr Clause h$a\ wn^ - ^ tes that c ^^eemeui 
agreed upoi • ^ * ' ' M Nothing in 
tl le A rbitrat ^ ' - rc:>b thai the arbitrators selected will not De neutral third partes 
Moreover, contran u- CFI's assertions,, the .Arbitration Clause can. readily be 
construed "o provide for meaning . • . iunjaiiiu 
inlcrpiu ' • Clause u uc 
h.iniiofiizecL to the extent possible. ' The first sentence states, "disagreements] over the 
terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated." (R. at 27.) Here, a central dispute between the 
parties is whether the Contract expired b> its own terms on Dec cm bei JI IWK, lui hi hue 
10 sansl) lite Sjnn iijil ( uiiniigriH'ics aiiJiiitiniled in tin1 ( 'miliar! Hit1 (' on tract allowed CFT 
to purchase the subject property only if the Special Contingencies were satisfied 
< * 1 .imong other things, that the devel.opm.ent receive final Master Plan, a p p r o \ <ii. >-*> iU 
thai ilic transaction, close no ' 
ijispni"' m fi wh« iher tlm <'"I iii nil c\(niinl In its own terms is a "disagreement over the 
terms" of the Contract. The arbitrators may be called upon to resolve this dispute pursuant 
to the first sentence of the Arbitration Clause.1 
The second sentence of the Arbitration Clause can be construed in harmony with the 
first sentence. The second sentence states, "[i]f agreement cannot be reached within 60 days 
from the beginning of the arbitration process Buyer shall receive its money back and this 
agreement shall be null and void." The second sentence may be viewed in at least two ways. 
First, it may be interpreted simply as imposing a 60-day time constraint within which the 
arbitration must be concluded. This interpretation comports with the parties' desire to avoid 
litigation and resolve any disputes out of court, by expeditious means, to avoid delays and 
complete development of the property prior to the 2002 Winter Olympic Games.2 (See 
Plumb Aff; R. at 157). Imposing such a time limit on the arbitration process is authorized 
by the Utah Arbitration Act. See Utah Code Ann. §78-3 la-10 ("An arbitration award shall 
be made within the time set by the agreement"). 
If CFI had agreed to arbitrate this matter when PWA requested it in November 1999, 
this entire case would have been avoided. CFI has sued for breach of contract. One 
cannot sue for breach of a purchase contract if the conditions to closing have not 
been satisfied prior to the closing deadline. See, e.g. Wells v. L.W.A., Inc., 470 
S.E.2d 510, 512 (Ga. App. 1996) (holding there can be no claim for breach of 
purchase contract where conditions were not satisfied as of closing deadline). 
Assuming the arbitrators were to determine the Contract expired by its own terms, 
there would be no basis for this lawsuit. 
Indeed, the trial court specifically found that "the Addendum provision regarding 
arbitration . . . is evidence that the parties were loathe to impede the development if 
the Agreement faltered and a dispute ensued." (Minute Entry, at 3-4; R. at 425-26). 
Alternatively, the second sentence may be viewed as an agreement regarding the 
specific type of alternative dispute resolution process to be followed, and the default remedy 
to be ordered by the arbitrators in the event the agreed-upon process does not result in a 
resolution.3 Courts have consistently held that contracting parties may determine their own 
dispute resolution process, and may limit the scope of the arbitrator's authority. See City 
and County of Denver v. District Court, 939 P.2d 1353,1361 (Colo. 1997); In re Clawson, 
783 P.2d 1230,1231 (Hawaii 1989); Board of Education v. Ewig, 609 P.2d 10,12 (Alaska 
1980).4 CFI has cited no case law or other legal authority indicating that parties to a contract 
cannot define their own arbitration process or limit the arbitrator's authority in this manner. 
CFI complains that the default remedy of the second sentence (i.e., the return of CFI's 
$50,000 earnest money deposit) is not fair and should not be applied. CFI asserts, for the 
first time in the history of this case, that the default remedy is an unenforceable liquidated 
damages provision. (See Brief of Appellee at 16-17.) Again, CFI's argument fails. In the 
context of this Arbitration Clause, the default remedy cannot function as a liquidated 
damages provision. By definition, in a liquidated damages provision, the parties stipulate 
to a sum of money to be paid, as compensatory damages, in the event of a breach of the 
3
 Either way, the parties' dispute over the meaning of the second sentence of the 
Arbitration Clause represents a "disagreement over the terms of [the] agreement" 
which "shall be arbitrated" pursuant to the first sentence. See Arbitration Clause. 
4
 CFI's attempt to distinguish these cases falls short. The minimal factual differences 
of the cases do not detract from the significance of the legal principle for which they 
stand, namely, that parties may define the scope of the arbitrators' authority. 
contract. See Woodhaven Apartmentsv. Washington,942¥2&9\^92\QJ\?ki\991). This 
avoids the necessity of proving the exact amount of damages sustained. 
Here, the default remedy is not contingent upon a determination that a party has 
breached the Contract. It simply applies if the parties are unable to reach agreement on a 
dispute over the terms of the Contract. Questions of breach and liability never come into 
play. The default remedy does not even contemplate the payment of any compensatory 
damages, only the return of CFI's earnest money deposit. 
In any event, regardless of how the second sentence of the Arbitration Clause is 
interpreted, it should not be construed to defeat the mandate of the first sentence that 
disagreements under the Contract "shall be arbitrated." The first sentence is clear, 
unambiguous, and controlling. It reflects the parties' intent to arbitrate disputes over the 
terms of the Contract. 
More importantly, CFI is a sophisticated entity, one of the largest timeshare 
condominium developers in the world. It negotiated the terms of the Contract, including the 
Arbitration Provision, at arms-length. Under different circumstances, the default remedy 
may have worked to CFI's benefit and PWA's detriment. CFI cannot now complain of the 
bargain it made. The trial court erred in altering the parties' agreement on the arbitration 
process and default remedy set forth in the second sentence of the Arbitration Clause. 
Therefore, the trial court's refusal to compel arbitration ignored fundamental principles of 
contract interpretation and should be reversed. 
II. THE PARTIES' DISPUTE PLAINLY FALLS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE 
ARBITRATION CLAUSE. 
The parties' dispute constitutes a "disagreement over the terms" of the Contract, 
bringing it squarely within the Arbitration Clause. CFFs primary claim is that PWA failed 
to obtain Master Plan approval from Summit County, as allegedly required under the terms 
of the Contract. (See Complaint; R. at 6). Paragraph 6 of the Contract Addendum, however, 
requires the parties to submit their plans to the County simultaneously; and CFI failed to 
submit its own plan and architecture. (See R. at 494). CFFs other claims for damages 
likewise arise out of, and relate directly to, disagreements over the application and the effect 
of several key provisions of the Contract and the Contract Addendum. (See R. at 493-96). 
CFI sidesteps the fact that its own claims relate to disagreements over the Contract's 
terms by arguing that Sections 15 and 16 of the Contract give it the right to bring an action 
in court. CFFs selective interpretation of the Contract, however, would render the 
Arbitration Clause meaningless and ignores the manifest intent of the parties to avoid 
litigation. CFFs interpretation also ignores the plain language of the Contract Addendum, 
which states that when a provision of the Contract Addendum modifies or conflicts with 
"any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers," the Addendum 
controls. (Contract; R. at 26-27). Here, Section 15 and 16 are modified by and conflict with 
the Arbitration Clause because they purport to address the manner of dispute resolution. 
Consequently, under the terms of the Contract Addendum, the Arbitration Clause supersedes 
Sections 15 and 16 of the Contract. 
This application of the Arbitration Clause is firmly supported by CFFs own 
admission that Sections 15 and 16 broadly cover any dispute relating to the Contract. See 
Brief of Appellee at 18. In fact, if construed as proposed by CFI, Sections 15 and 16 would 
completely displace and swallow up the Arbitration Clause. For instance, if Sections 15 and 
16 applied, as CFI suggests, the Arbitration Clause would be superfluous. Any dispute 
"over the terms of the Contract" could easily be characterized as a dispute or claim "relating 
to the Contract." As a result, any party disputing the terms of the Contract could classify its 
dispute as one "relating to the Contract" and file a lawsuit in the courts, thereby stripping 
the Arbitration Clause of any effect. CFFs interpretation of the Contract is unreasonable and 
fails to harmonize and give effect to all terms of the Contract.5 In short, this Court should 
hold that the Arbitration Clause conflicts with and, by operation of the Contract Addendum, 
supersedes Sections 15 and 16 of the Contract. 
III. PWA DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THE 
STANDARDS SET FORTH IN CHANDLER. 
CFI asserts that PWA waived its right to arbitration when it sought to have the lis 
pendens removed from the property. CFI relies heavily on Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue 
Shield, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah 1992), in which this Court stated that a "party claiming waiver 
CFI argues that Section 15 provides for disputes involving "the breach or termination 
o f the Contract. Section 15, however, mentions such disputes only as an example 
of the broad range of disputes covered under that provision. Because of the breadth 
of Section 15, that section conflicts with, and is superseded by, the Arbitration 
Clause. 
has the burden" to establish both that the party seeking arbitration has substantially 
participated "in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate" and that it has 
been prejudiced. Id. at 358-60. A waiver of arbitration "'is not a favored finding, and there 
is a presumption against it.'" Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 660 
(5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 
In Chandler, this Court made clear that the determination of waiver is a highly fact-
intensive inquiry. Chandler, 833 P.2d at 358. In PWA's case, the trial court made the 
factual determination that PWA had not waived its right to arbitration. (R. at 762-63.) As 
shown below, because CFI has failed to satisfy its heavy burden to rebut the presumption 
of non-waiver, this Court should reject CFFs argument. 
A. PWA Has Failed to Show That PWA Participated in the Litigation in a 
Manner Inconsistent With the Intent to Arbitrate, 
CFI argues that PWA's participation in this case was inconsistent with an intent to 
arbitrate. In particular, CFI cites the pleadings filed by PWA in connection with its Motion 
to Dismiss and to Quiet Title (the "Motion to Dismiss"). See Brief of Appellee at 23. CFFs 
arguments, however, focus exclusively on "substantial participation" and ignore the "intent" 
element of the Chandlerlest. Moreover, CFI fails to recognize a critical distinction between 
PWA's Motion to Dismiss and the proceedings discussed in the case law CFI cites. 
1. PWA Was Forced to Move for Dismissal of the Action Because of 
the Threat of Irreparable Harm Created by CFPs Lis Pendens. 
I Allowing its receipt of CFPs complaint and the lis pendens, PWA did not have the 
luxury of simply moving to compel arbitration.6 Rather, PWA had to act immediately to 
secure the release of CFPs wrongful lis pendens recorded against the entire seventy-five acre 
Frostwood parcel P'¥v A w as forced, by CFPs recording of the lis pendens, to participate 
in the court proceedings, and properly invoked the emergency-relief provisions of the 
Wrongful Lien Act. (R. at 15-17). 
Significantly, in none of the cases cited by CFI was a party required to seek 
immediate, emergency relief in cour tfroi i I a threat ofirreparable harm caused b> the • - it. 
In its Minute Enti y on PWA's Motion to Dismiss, the trial court recognized the adverse 
effects of the lis pendens on the timely development of the entire Canyons SPA: 
[I]n the absence of the availability of specific performance, the 
justification for a Lis Pendens that encumbers the property and 
impedes an admittedly time-sensitive project is diminished. The 
equities weigh against permitting the Lis Pendens to remain, and 
the Addendum provision regarding arbitration... is evidence 
that the parties were loathe to impede the development if the 
Agreement faltered and a dispute ensued. To allow the Lis 
Pendens to remain in force under these circumstances would be 
absolutely contrary to that intention, and the harm to defendants 
In a letter to counsel for CFI dated November 12,1999, counsel for PWA expressly 
relied on the Arbitration Clause: "Paragraph 12 of Addendum Number 1 expressly 
provides that 'any disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated 
by parties agreed upon by both Buyer and Seller.' Paragraph 12 was included in the 
parties agreement for the express purpose of avoiding litigation." (Answer & 
Counterclaim, Ex. "3"; R. 18-19.) 
and other affected parties far outweighs any potential benefit 
to plaintiff. Plaintiffs own arguments . . . give cogent support to 
defendants' contention that delay in the proposed proj ect threatens 
substantial loss to many parties. 
(Minute Entry, at 3-4; R. at 425-26; emphasis added). 
Indeed, assuming PWA had immediately filed and prevailed on a motion to compel 
arbitration, PWA still nunhl tu\f had In pailu ipak' in nnlLitim1 .in arhifi af ion pioceeding, 
selecting arbitrators, and scheduling an arbitration hearing ~ all without the assurance that 
the arbitrator could grant any emergency relief or order the release of the lis pendens, CFI 
completely ignores this critical procedural distinction. Because the lis pendens threatened 
to under n line the tii nel> (lei > elopmei it of tl le e 'amons SPA, PW A w as forced to 
participate in the initial litigation. PWA, therefore, did not waive its right to arbitration by 
taking necessary measures in court to secure the release of the lis pendens. Accordingly, for 
purposes of the Chandler test, PWA did not "substantially participate" in1 .x\\> 
"inconsistent with the iiiient lo arbitrate." 833 1" 2d at 358-60. 
2. AH the Pleadings or Other Filings Submitted by PWA Related 
Either to Obtaining Relief from the Lis Pendens or Were Required 
to be Filed Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In arguing that P¥v A., has waived its arbitration nehls. ( I-1 noes lo great lengths lo 
emphasize the numhi :» A' pleadings or other documents filed by PW A. See Brief of 
Appellee at 23. CFI fails to note, however, that, PWA's submissions were filed either to 
obtain relief from the lis pendens or to comply with requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. CFI also fails to recognize that, in nearly all of PW A's early cftorN i. 
relief froi i 1 the lis pendens, P W A. repeatedly affirmed andpreser v ed its right to arbitration. 
For instance, most of PWA's arguments in its Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Dismiss and to Quiet Title ("Dismissal Memorandum") were devoted to securing the 
release of the lis pendens. (Dismissal Memorandum at 15-23; R at 93-101 ) I he remaii icier 
of the Dismissal ]\ lemorandi n ii foci iseci oi I PWA ""s argi lments regarding the automatic 
termination of the Purchase Contract. Significantly, as an alternative to dismissal, PWA 
requested that the Court compel arbitration pursuant to the Utah Arbitration Act. (Id. at 14 
n.3; R. at 102.) To enhance its ability to obtain a release i • u ..-; w uk >ns, I *\V 
filed a Counterclaii i i , w hich raised five claims for relief, • - :
 s. i i i \ -s a claim for wrongful lien. 
All the claims for relief related directly to PWA's efforts to have the lis pendens removed 
or to the Arbitration Clause itself, or were compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
• the First Claim for Relief sought a declaratory judgment, under the Arbitration 
Clause, among other grounds, that CFI had no basis to record the lis pendens; 
• the Second Claim for Relief was brought under the Wrongful Lien Act to 
PWA's wrongful lien claim in its Minute Entry ordering the release of the lis pendens; 
• the Third Claim for Relief seeks relief on the grounds of estoppel arising ftom 
I ) W .,„ \ " s detrimei ital reliance on CFI's express promise to arbiti ate tl le v ery type of dispute 
at issue in the lawsuit; 
• the Fourth Claim for Relief is for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing based, in large part, on CFI's failure to arbitrate its claims under the I }ui chase 
Contract; ai id 
• the Fifth Claim for Relief is for breach of the Purchase Contract, a compulsory 
counterclaim under Rule 13. 
(R. at 34-40.) 
CFI also i nakes i 111 icl 1 of tl le fact that PW 4. participated in the preparation of a case 
management order and in the exchange of Rule 26(a) initial disclosures. See Brief of 
Appellee at 24. Such actions, however, are a far cry from the "five months" of discovery, 
including participation in depositions, conducted by the defendants in Chandlei See 833 
P.2d at. 360-61. Furthern lore, P W \ and CFI were required, under the time limitations of the 
new procedural rules, to participate in preparing the case management order and to exchange 
initial disclosures. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a). 
• lid not delay its efforts to enforce the Arbiti atioi I Clai lse I >W A, filed its 
Motion In (!ompd Arbitration only eight days following the Court's entry of the Order 
on the Motion to Dismiss and only five days after the exchange of initial disclosures, 
which did not include the production of any documents. PWA's compliance with its 
Rule 26 obligations, followed quickly by the filing of its Motion to Compel \»* • . i? ai n 
are not iruiii'atiu: nl'an mtcnl In Umose litmation o\ei arbitration 
PWA's actions in this case have not demonstrated "an intent to proceed to trial." To 
the contrary, PWA responded to CFFs lawsuit with the intent to obtain emergency relief 
from the lis pendens, while at the same time reaffirming its right to a.paMti< 
securing relief fi-nn the lis pendens, PWA, immediatelx moved In enforce its arbitration 
rights under the Contract. See Williams, 56 F.3d at 661 (concluding that party did not waive 
arbitration by removing action to federal court; filing motion to dismiss, answer, 
counterclaim, and motion to stay; and exchanging Rule 26 discovery). I Ji idei tl le se 
circumstances, ('i'I utnii'»l nuvl ilsheau h in In i of showing tha i VvAnas "substantially 
participated" in the litigation "to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate." Chandler, 
833 P.2d at 360. In sum, CFI fails to meet the first prong of Chandler. 
CFI Has Failed to Meet Its Heavy Burden to Show Prejudice. 
WW has failed hi show lhai il suffered prejudice as a result of PWA's actions in 
obtaining relief from the lis pendens and complying with its Rule 26(a) obligations. In 
Chandler, the court emphasized that the prejudice must "be of such a nature that the party 
opposing arbilmhon suffers sonic real lianii,1" Chandler, 833 P.2dat 360. Here, PWAhas 
suffered no such harm. 
CFI argues that PWA obtained an unfair advantage by obtaining dismissal O\K . > i s 
claim for specific per formal ice. See Brief of \ppellee at 26 As show i I above, 1 • jr, 
CFFs lis pendens threatened the timely development of the entire SPA P W : \ had i 10 choice 
bul to seek immediate relief from the ("our! Moreover, even though PWA succeeded in 
securing the release of CFFs lis pendens, the Court did not dismiss the action in its entirety, 
but permitted CFI to pursue its breach of contract claims. 
CI -I also contends that it has been prej i idiced b> P W k' s "forum shopping." See Brief 
of Appellee at 26. CFI fails to offer any objective evidence, however, that PWA attempted 
to forum shop after testing the "'judicial waters.'" Chandler, 833 I .<.; ai l) (citation 
omitted). Again, tl le trial ecu it t w as the 01 il> 1- • *•' M ' - **:*" v •• lief from the 
unlawful lis pendens was available. 
Finally, CFI argues that it has incurred substantial expense as a result of PU A's 
litigation activities. The bjK »f CFFs expenses, how e\ er , are of its ow n making and ai e 
attributable to defending its unlawful lis pendens, which was improper and threatened 
irreparable harm to the Canyons SPA. CFFs expenses relating to its defense of the Motion 
to Dismiss were incurred solely because o' ' ^ * lis 
pendens. Indeed, by letter dated November 12,1999, counsel for PWA demanded that CFI 
release the unlawful lis pendens and explained that PWA would otherwise pursue a claim 
for wrongful lien. | K nt5W \ I la\ nig been gi\en III*: O|I|»OIUJNII\ loivmeih the^ron lull 
lis pendens, CFI cannot now be heard to complain about the expenses it has incurred. 
Similarly, CFI cannot be heard to complain about expenses when CFI was the one 
who opposed every effort of! u "v tn use arbitration as the means of resolvmy the parlies' 
dispi ite Before taking acti< our t, PWA repeatedly requested CFI to arbitrate. Only 
after CFFs refusals to arbitrate did PWA act in court. In short, I " ft > \. s limited and foci lsed 
efforts to seek emergency relief from the // spendem simply do not compare to the voluntary 
"extensive discovery" conducted by Blue Cross in Chandler. Also, CFI fails to note that 
much of PWA's early efforts in this case focused on asserting 1 *W Vs right to arbitrate (tic 
dispute. Such el It mis In affirm (lie eonlr.u (IJMI tight *u :. *ii' b\ definition, cannot cause 
prejudice under the Chandler standard. 
As shown above, CFI has failed to meet its heavy burden to show some "real harm" 
attributable t \ . s efforts to secure relief from the lispei ide? is Chm idle? S o p.^u ox 
360. Iherefore, this Court should reject CFFs arguments and refuse to affirm the trial 
court's order on the basis of waiver. 
• • r o w ' M I N I O N 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial court's order denying the 
Motion to Compel Arbitration and remand with instructions that an order compelling 
arbitration be entered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j^^Vlay of January, 2001. 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, T T p 
Craig H. Howe 
Attorneys for Park West Associates 
and Beaver Creek Associates 
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